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BREAKING THE LAW’S 
GRIP ON EQUALITY: A 
NEW PARADIGM FOR 
SECTION 15 
Christopher D. Bredt  
Adam M. Dodek* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Equality is an elusive and sometimes divisive concept. The Supreme Court 
of Canada has struggled with the interpretation of equality, tacking back and 
forth between periods of unanimity and division in its interpretation of section 
15. The late 1980s was a period of unanimity in the Court’s initial attempts to 
define the right to equality under section 15, most notably with Law Society of 
British Columbia v. Andrews.1 However, within a number of years that 
unanimity broke down as the Court fractured into at least three different 
approaches to the interpretation of section 15, set out most notably in the 1995 
Equality Trilogy.2 By 1999, the Court had returned to unanimity in the Law 
decision,3 setting out a complicated multi-factor contextual analysis 
conceptually anchored in the idea of human dignity. However, the unanimity of 
Law proved to be short-lived. By 2002, Law was beginning to rupture at the 
seams, so that in 2003 we are back to where we were less than eight years ago: 
                                                                                                                                                              
*  Borden Ladner Gervais LLP Toronto. Christopher Bredt is the National Chair of Borden 
Ladner Gervais LLP’s Constitutional Law Practice Group of which Adam Dodek is a member. The 
authors would like to express their gratitude to Monique Higham for superb research assistance on 
this paper and to Jamie Cameron, Elissa Goodman, Brock Martland, Dwight Newman, Josh Pater-
son and John Pottow for reading earlier drafts of this article and providing helpful comments. 
1
  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter “Andrews”].  
2
  Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 [hereinafter “Miron”]; Thibaudeau v. Canada, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 627 [hereinafter “Thibaudeau”]; and Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [herein-
after “Egan”] (collectively the “Equality Trilogy”). 
3
  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [herein-
after “Law”]. 
34  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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section 15 jurisprudence is entangled in an overly-complicated analysis which 
produces a high degree of uncertainty. It is not without cause that the Chief 
Justice of Canada has termed equality “the most difficult right.”4 
In this paper, we argue for a revised approach to the interpretation of section 
15. We argue that section 15 has become overly “contextualized” which has 
two effects, both negative. First, the emphasis on context in section 15 has 
made interpreting equality more elusive than ever, losing the sort of certainty 
and predictability that is an important element of the rule of law under our 
Constitution. Second, Law’s penchant for context has essentially eviscerated 
any role for section 1, which is the proper place where the balancing of interests 
should take place. 
This paper has five parts in addition to this introduction. In Part II, we trace 
the evolution of the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence up until Law. In 
Part III, we analyze and critique the Law decision and its aftermath.5 In Part IV, 
we identify four key principles relevant to the analysis of equality. We then 
apply these principles in Part V where we propose a simplified, less contextual 
approach to section 15 which is more akin to the test the Supreme Court 
originally articulated in Andrews. More particularly, we argue that in analyzing 
a claim brought under section 15, the Court should apply the following 
framework: first, the inquiry under section 15 should be confined to two 
questions: (i) does the law have either the purpose or effect of disadvantaging 
the claimant; and (ii) is the disadvantage drawn on the basis of one or more 
enumerated or analogous grounds; and second, if a prima facie violation of 
section 15(1) is found, the inquiry should move to section 1 where the 
government bears the burden of justifying the reasonableness of the restriction 
on equality. In articulating this test, we argue that all considerations of 
reasonableness are properly considered under section 1 and not under section 
                                                                                                                                                              
4
  The Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d), 17. 
5
  See Christopher D. Bredt & Ira Nishisato, “The Supreme Court’s New Equality: A Cri-
tique” (2000) 8 Canada Watch 16; Christopher D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, “The Increasing 
Irrelevance of Section 1 of the Charter” (2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d), 175, at 181-82. Numerous 
others have criticized Law: see e.g. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1997), vol. 2, at para. 52.7(b); Beverly Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting 
Equality” (2000) 11 Const. F. 65; Sheilagh Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and 
Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at 319-32; June Ross, “The Supreme Court’s New 
Equality Test: A Critique” (September-October 2000) 8 Can. Watch 16; Jamie Cameron, “A Work 
in Progress: The Supreme Court and the Charter’s Equation of Rights and Limits” in Debra M. 
McAllister & Adam M. Dodek, eds., The Charter at Twenty: Law and Practice 2002 (Toronto: 
OBA, 2002) 31; Lori Sterling, “The Impact of Lovelace v. Ontario on Section 15 of the Charter” 
(2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 53, at 59-60. 
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15(1). Finally, in Part VI we offer some concluding comments on the 
challenges of section 15. 
II. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 15 JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence has constantly been a work in 
progress. To date there have been four identifiable periods in section 15 
adjudication: (1) the early period, defined by Andrews and subsequent cases; 
(2) the fragmentation of equality, defined by the Equality Trilogy; (3) the 
ascension of unanimity and the Law decision; and (4) the post-Law breakdown 
of unanimity. This section will analyze the first two periods in the development 
of the Supreme Court’s section 15 jurisprudence. 
1. Equality’s Early Years: 1982-1995 
Section 15 provides:  
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
The first period in the development of equality jurisprudence under the 
Charter is also the longest. While the Charter came into force on April 17, 
1982, section 15’s enactment was delayed for three years to give provincial and 
federal governments time to review their statute books and bring legislation 
into compliance with the new equality guarantee.6 The fundamental difficulty in 
this exercise was that section 15 had never been judicially considered and it 
was very difficult for government legal advisors to predict how it would be 
interpreted.7 Thus, the first Supreme Court decision on section 15 was not 
released until February 1989, over half-way through this initial period. 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”]. 
7
  See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 
797 [hereinafter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed.]. Professor Hogg identified the 
central problem with this mandate; it was difficult to provide any sort of confident opinion as to 
whether any given law would infringe s. 15 before that section had been judicially considered. Id. It 
would have been interesting and perhaps more helpful if the federal government had directed a 
36  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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In Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews,8 McIntyre J. set out the 
Court’s initial approach to section 15.9 After reviewing various attempts to 
define discrimination, McIntyre J. articulated discrimination under section 15 in 
the following terms: 
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether 
intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the 
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or 
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which 
withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits or advantages available to other 
members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an 
individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the 
charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities 
will rarely be so classed.10 
Justice McIntyre reviewed three possible approaches to section 15(1). The 
first, proffered by Professor Peter Hogg in the 1985 edition of Constitutional 
Law of Canada,11 would treat every distinction drawn by law as discrimination 
under section 15(1) which must be justified under section 1. The second 
approach was one that McLachlin J.A. (as she then was) had put forward in the 
B.C. Court of Appeal in Andrews and involved a consideration of the 
reasonableness and fairness of the impugned legislation under section 15(1).12 
Justice McIntyre preferred a third approach, the “enumerated or analogous 
grounds” approach under which discrimination for the purpose of section 15(1) 
is generally expressed by the enumerated grounds: “Section 15(1) is designed 
to prevent discrimination based on these and analogous grounds.”13 
Having defined discrimination in this manner, McIntyre J. explained that 
“[a] complainant under section 15(1) must show not only that he or she is not 
receiving equal treatment before and under the law or that the law has a 
differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law 
but, in addition, must show that the legislative impact of the law is 
                                                                                                                                                              
reference to the Supreme Court on the application of s. 15 to a particular piece of legislation during 
the three-year waiting period. 
8
  Andrews, supra, note 1. 
9
  Andrews was heard on October 5 and 6, 1989 by Dickson C.J.C., McIntyre, Lamer, Wil-
son, Le Dain, La Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. Justice Le Dain took no part in the judgment 
which was rendered 16 months later on February 2, 1989. Id. 
10
  Id., at 174-75. 
11
  Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., supra, note 7, at 797-801. 
12
  Andrews, supra, note 1, at 179. 
13
  Id., at 180. Justice La Forest, concurring, left open the possibility that there might be room 
under s. 15 for judicial intervention “beyond the traditionally established and analogous policies 
against discrimination discussed by my colleague ….” Id., at 194. 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Breaking the Law’s 37 
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discriminatory.” Furthermore, under Andrews, any consideration of 
reasonableness or of factors which could justify the discrimination takes place 
at the section 1 stage.14 It is the fleshing out of the “discrimination” component 
that would later divide and ensnare the Court. 
The Andrews enumerated and analogous grounds approach was applied in 
subsequent cases such as Turpin15 and McKinney.16 In each of these cases, the 
Court applied Andrews and its inquiry focused on the question of whether the 
impugned government action imposed a burden or denied a benefit on the basis 
of an enumerated or analogous ground. The analysis in this respect was 
straightforward and issues of justification, explanation or reasonableness of the 
impugned classification were left, if at all, for section 1. For example, in 
McKinney, La Forest J., writing for the majority, found that the University of 
Guelph’s mandatory retirement policy was discriminatory within the meaning 
of section 15(1) of the Charter since the distinction was based on the 
enumerated personal characteristic of age. His analysis was succinct and direct, 
taking little more than a paragraph. He found that there was no doubt that the 
mandatory retirement policies imposed a burden on the employees at issue. 
Next, he determined that mandatory retirement takes away the benefit of 
working on the basis of the personal characteristic of age attributed to an 
individual solely because of their association with a group (i.e. workers over 
65).17 
2. The Fragmentation of Equality: 1995-1999 
Even during section 15’s early years, fissures had started to develop in the 
Court’s interpretative approach to equality. Various members of the Court 
added their own gloss to McIntyre J.’s directive in Andrews that a distinction 
with respect to an enumerated or analogous group had to be “discriminatory.” 
For example, in McKinney, Wilson J. writing in dissent, opined: 
It follows, in my opinion, that the mere fact that the distinction drawn in this case 
has been drawn on the basis of age does not automatically lead to some kind of 
irrebuttable presumption of prejudice. Rather it compels one to ask the question: is 
there prejudice? Is the mandatory retirement policy a reflection of the stereotype of 
                                                                                                                                                              
14
  Id., at 182. 
15
  R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (finding no discrimination under s. 15(1) where provi-
sions of the Criminal Code treated persons charged with an offence in Alberta differently than 
those charged with the same offence in Ontario; persons resident outside of Alberta charged with an 
offence could not be considered a “discrete and insular” minority within the contemplation of s. 
15(1) of the Charter).  
16
  McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter “McKinney”]. 
17
  Id., at 269. 
38  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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old age? Is there an element of human dignity at issue? Are academics being 
required to retire at age 65 on the unarticulated premise that with age comes 
increasing incompetence and decreasing intellectual capacity? I think the answer to 
these questions is clearly yes and that s. 15 is accordingly infringed.18 
These fissures erupted into chasms in the 1995 Equality Trilogy. In these 
three cases released simultaneously on May 25, 1995 — Miron v. Trudel,19 
Thibaudeau v. Canada,20 and Egan v. Canada21 — three distinct approaches to 
section 15 emerged from the decisions of the Supreme Court. The first test, set 
out by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Miron v. Trudel, focused on the 
application of stereotypes: 
The analysis under s. 15(1) involves two steps. First the claimant must show a 
denial of “equal protection” or “equal benefit of the law, as compared to some other 
person. Second, the claimant must show that the denial constitutes discrimination. 
At this second stage, in order for discrimination to be made out, the claimant must 
show that the denial rests on one of the grounds enumerated in s. 15(1) or an 
analogous ground and that the unequal treatment is based on the stereotypical 
application of presumed group or personal characteristics.22 
In Egan, Cory J., writing for himself and Iacobucci J. (with Sopinka J. 
expressing his agreement with their analysis), set out the test for a violation of 
section 15(1) in slightly different terms. Their inquiry focused not on 
“stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics” but 
rather simply on distinctions that flow from “personal characteristics.”23 
Subsequently, Iacobucci J. referred to McLachlin J.’s “stereotypical 
application” test and Cory J.’s “personal characteristics” test as “essentially 
alike,” which was reflected by Cory, Sopinka, and Iacobucci JJ. concurring 
with McLachlin J. in Miron.24 
The second section 15(1) test was set out by Gonthier J. in Miron. It 
followed McLachlin J.’s approach in that it also required that a distinction be 
found and that this distinction constitute discrimination. However, in 
determining what distinctions constitute discrimination, Gonthier J. added a 
relevancy inquiry. In order for a violation of section 15(1) to be established 
under Gonthier J.’s test, the grounds of the distinction must be irrelevant to the 
purpose of the legislation. In other words, a denial of equality based on an 
                                                                                                                                                              
18
  Id., at 393 (per Wilson J., dissenting).  
19
  Supra, note 2. 
20
  Id. 
21
  Id. 
22
  Miron, supra, note 2, at 485 (per McLachlin J.). 
23
  Egan, supra, note 2, at 597-99. 
24
  See Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, at 390. 
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enumerated or analogous ground would not in every case constitute 
discrimination. Gonthier J. explained his reasoning in the following terms: 
To the extent, then, that a law in any given case mirrors or reflects a distinction 
drawn on such a basis that is relevant to its functional values which are not 
themselves discriminatory, the distinction drawn by the law will not be 
discriminatory.25 
Finally, L’Heureux-Dubé J. set out a third approach in Miron. According to 
this test, a distinction must first be proven to deny equality rights on the basis 
of membership in an identifiable group, then that distinction must be shown to 
be discriminatory. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé rejected the restriction of section 15 
to enumerated and analogous grounds. Rather, her test weighed discrimination 
on a case by case basis by considering (1) the nature of the group affected by 
the distinction; and (2) the nature of the interest affected by the distinction. 
Included as discriminatory were those distinctions  
… capable of either promoting or perpetuating the view that the individual 
adversely affected by this distinction is less capable, or less worthy of recognition 
or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving 
of concern, respect, and consideration.26 
While failing to command the support of any of her colleagues at the time, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s focus on context and dignity would prove highly 
influential in the Supreme Court’s re-articulation of the equality test in Law v. 
Canada. 
The Supreme Court’s fragmentation on the interpretation of section 15 
confounded courts and lawyers who were forced to analyze equality claims 
under three different rubrics and attempt to synthesize the approaches in order 
to reach some conclusion as to what the governing law from the Supreme Court 
of Canada was. What emerged during the period between Andrews and Law 
was “an inchoate mass of principles, tests, and methodologies.”27 
III. LAW’S PROMISE AND FAILURE 
1. The Rule of Law: 1999-2001 
Within a few years of the Equality Trilogy, it became apparent that the 
continuation of a regime of fragmented approaches to section 15 was seriously 
damaging any attempt to develop consistent or coherent jurisprudence in this 
                                                                                                                                                              
25
  Miron, supra, note 2, at 436 (per Gonthier J.). 
26
  Miron, supra, note 2, at 465-77 (per L’Heureux-Dubé J.). 
27
  Cameron, supra, note 5, at 35. 
40  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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area. Lower court decisions became a guessing game as to how the three 
different approaches would line up in any particular case. By 1998, when Law 
v. Canada28 was heard at the Supreme Court, even that Court had apparently 
come to the conclusion that the fragmentation of section 15 could not continue. 
In what must have been a Herculean effort of judicial brokering, Justice 
Iacobucci forged a new unanimous approach to section 15. Not surprisingly, the 
“Law approach” combined features from all three separate strands of equality 
interpretation. 
The Supreme Court explained that in articulating a revised approach to the 
interpretation of section 15(1), it was inappropriate to confine the analysis to a 
“fixed and limited formula.” Instead, “[a] purposive and contextual approach to 
discrimination is to be preferred, in order to permit the realization of the strong 
remedial purpose of the equality guarantee, and to avoid the pitfalls of a 
formalistic or mechanical approach.”29 The Court then unified its previous 
jurisprudence, noting that its previous approaches to section 15(1) had focused 
on three central issues: 
(A) whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and 
others, in purpose or effect; 
(B) whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination 
are the basis for the differential treatment; and 
(C)  whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory 
within the meaning of the equality guarantee.30 
Justice Iacobucci then set out the template for courts to follow in 
adjudicating discrimination claims under section 15(1). He instructed courts to 
make the following three broad inquiries: 
 
(A) Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, 
or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged 
position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential 
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more 
personal characteristics? 
(B) Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more 
enumerated and analogous grounds? 
  and 
                                                                                                                                                              
28
  Supra, note 3.  
29
  Id., at para. 88. 
30
  Id.  
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(C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon 
or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects 
the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal 
characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or 
promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of 
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian 
society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration?31 
 
Justice Iacobucci identified the purpose of section 15(1) as preventing the 
violation of essential human dignity and freedom “through the imposition of 
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a 
society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or 
as members of Canadian society, equally capable and deserving of respect and 
consideration.”32 
In the critical next step, Iacobucci J. stated that the existence of a conflict 
between the purpose or effect of an impugned law and the purpose of section 
15(1) was “essential” to a finding of discrimination under that section. 
Moreover, determining whether such a conflict exists will henceforth require a 
full contextual analysis surrounding both the claimant and the claim. Law’s 
contextual approach also involves a comparative analysis where the claimant is 
measured against the appropriate comparator group.33 The list of contextual 
factors are open and include such items as (1) pre-existing disadvantage;34 (2) 
correspondence between the basis for the claim and the actual situation of the 
claimant;35 (3) the ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a 
                                                                                                                                                              
31
  Id. 
32
  Id. 
33
  “The equality guarantee is a comparative concept, which ultimately requires a court to es-
tablish one or more relevant comparators. The claimant generally chooses the person, group, or 
groups with whom he or she wishes to be compared for the purpose of the discrimination inquiry. 
However, where the claimant’s characterization of the comparison is insufficient, a court may, 
within the scope of the ground or grounds pleaded, refine the comparison presented by the claimant 
where warranted. Locating the relevant comparison group requires an examination of the subject-
matter of the legislation and its effects, as well as a full appreciation of context.” Id. 
34
  “Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the 
individual or group at issue. The effects of a law as they relate to the important purpose of s. 15(1) 
in protecting individuals or groups who are vulnerable, disadvantaged, or members of ‘discrete and 
insular minorities’ should always be a central consideration. Although the claimant’s association 
with a historically more advantaged or disadvantaged group or groups is not per se determinative of 
an infringement, the existence of these pre-existing factors will favour a finding that s. 15(1) has 
been infringed.” Id. 
35
  “The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground or grounds on which the claim 
is based and the actual need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant or others. Although the 
mere fact that the impugned legislation takes into account the claimant’s traits or circumstances will 
42  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
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more disadvantaged group;36 and (4) the nature and scope of the interest 
affected by the impugned law.37 
Ultimately, in Law, the Court found that the impugned provision of the 
Canadian Pension Plan which reduces survivors’ pension benefits for surviving 
spouses between 35 and 45 years of age and excludes them altogether for 
surviving spouses under 35 years old, did not constitute discrimination within 
the meaning of section 15(1) because neither the purpose nor the effect of the 
impugned provision violated the claimant’s human dignity. 
The Supreme Court applied the Law test with general agreement in the 
subsequent cases of Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern 
Affairs),38 M. v. H.,39 and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration).40 Importantly, in Lovelace v. Ontario,41 the Court eschewed a 
separate step of analysis for affirmative action under section 15(2). Instead, the 
Court rolled section 15(2) into the contextual mix under section 15(1). By 
2002, however, the Law consensus began to show strains. 
2. The Breakdown of the Rule of Law 
In 2002, the Supreme Court’s united application of the Law test broke down, 
revealing problems with Law’s methodology itself. First, in Lavoie v. Canada,42 
four different opinions emerged in a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
provision of the Public Service Employment Act, which affords preferential 
treatment to Canadian citizens in the federal public service.43 Second, in 
                                                                                                                                                              
not necessarily be sufficient to defeat a s. 15(1) claim, it will generally be more difficult to establish 
discrimination to the extent that the law takes into account the claimant’s actual situation in a 
manner that respects his or her value as a human being or member of Canadian society, and less 
difficult to do so where the law fails to take into account the claimant’s actual situation.” Id. 
36
  “The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged per-
son or group in society. An ameliorative purpose or effect which accords with the purpose of s. 
15(1) of the Charter will likely not violate the human dignity of more advantaged individuals where 
the exclusion of these more advantaged individuals largely corresponds to the greater need or the 
different circumstances experienced by the disadvantaged group being targeted by the legislation. 
This factor is more relevant where the s. 15(1) claim is brought by a more advantaged member of 
society.” Id. 
37
  “The more severe and localized the consequences of the legislation for the affected group, 
the more likely that the differential treatment responsible for these consequences is discriminatory 
within the meaning of s. 15(1).” Id. 
38
  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 [hereinafter “Corbière”]. 
39
  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
40
  [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 [hereinafter “Granovsky”]. 
41
  [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 2002 SCC 37 [hereinafter “Lovelace”]. 
42
  [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, 2002 SCC 23 [hereinafter “Lavoie”]. 
43
  R.S.C. 1985, c. P-33, s. 16(4)(c). 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Breaking the Law’s 43 
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Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),44 the Court split 5-4 on whether 
Quebec welfare legislation, which provided reduced benefits for individuals 
under the age of 30 who were not in job training programs, violated section 
15(1) of the Charter. 
In Lavoie, seven of the nine justices found that the impugned provision 
violated section 15, but for two different reasons. Moreover, four of those seven 
justices upheld the law under section 1 which meant that when coupled with the 
two justices who did not find a section 15(1) violation, the impugned provision 
was upheld by the Court 6-3. On one approach to section 15(1), Bastarache J. 
(Gonthier, Iacobucci and Major JJ., concurring) held that the law imposed 
differential treatment on the analogous ground of citizenship. He termed the 
impugned preferences “substantive discrimination” because differentiating 
between citizens and non-citizens was not based on individual capacity or 
merit, but rather on a stereotypical differentiation that burdened an already 
disadvantaged group. On another approach, McLachlin C.J.C. and L’Heureux-
Dubé J. (with Binnie J. concurring), also found that the law violated section 15, 
but emphasized that it violated human dignity by forcing individuals who 
sought employment from the public service to become citizens: “[t]he very act 
of forcing some people to make such a choice violates human dignity, and is 
therefore inherently discriminatory.”45 Justice Arbour, writing for herself, found 
no violation of section 15(1). She was sharply critical of Bastarache J.’s focus 
on the subjective element to the human dignity inquiry, raising the alarm that it 
threatened irrevocable damage to the Law methodology.46 Examining the 
various contextual factors, Arbour J. concluded that the impugned law did not 
violate essential human dignity and thus was not discriminatory within the 
meaning of section 15(1). Justice LeBel concurred in Arbour J.’s assessment of 
this issue.47 
In Gosselin, decided in December 2002, the breakdown of the rule of Law 
continued. The case involved a challenge to a Quebec regulation that provided 
for reduced welfare benefits for individuals under 30 who were not 
participating in training or work experience programs.48 In a 5-4 decision, the 
Supreme Court decided that the impugned regulation did not violate section 
15(1).49 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for herself and Gonthier, Iacobucci, 
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  2002 SCC 84 [hereinafter “Gosselin”].  
45
  Lavoie, supra, note 42, at para. 5. 
46
  Id., at paras. 80-81 (per Arbour J.). 
47
  Id., at para. 124. He wrote separately to distance himself from Arbour J.’s comments re-
garding the application of s. 1. Id., at para. 125. 
48
  See Regulation Respecting Social Aid, R.R.Q. 1981, c. A-16, r. 1, s. 29(a).  
49
  A challenge to the impugned regulations was brought under both s. 7 and s. 15. The Court 
held 7-2 that the regulations did not violate s. 7, with L’Heureux-Dubé and Arbour JJ., dissenting.  
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Major, and Binnie JJ., held that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden 
of proof under the third branch of the Law test. According to the Court, the 
claimant had failed to demonstrate that the government treated her as less 
worthy than older welfare recipients simply because it conditioned increased 
payments on her participation in programs that were specifically designed to 
integrate her into the workforce and to promote her long-term self-sufficiency. 
The four dissenters took three different approaches to their collective 
conclusion that the impugned regulation violated the claimant’s human dignity 
and thus infringed her right to equality under section 15(1).50 Gosselin thus 
provides four separate analyses under the Law test and four different 
conceptions of the human dignity at issue in the case. 
3. A Critique of Law  
The Law methodology suffers from numerous problems, both practical and 
principled.51 We focus on three: (i) the complexity and indeterminacy of the 
Law methodology; (ii) Law’s usurpation of section 1’s role; and (iii) Law’s 
creation of a “hierarchy of suffering.”52  
On the first point, a rather indicting critique was recently set out by Professor 
Jamie Cameron: 
Under the burden of layered and overlapping criteria, Charter analysis has become 
less accessible, to the point at times of impenetrable. For instance, the question of 
breach under section 15 is answered by a multi-step test, which incorporates 
subdivisions and further guidelines. That side of the equation is then followed by 
the several parts of the Oakes test, which is applied to determine whether limits are 
justifiable. Yet with prolix, cumulative doctrines the probability that the boundaries 
between breach and justification will blur can only crease. In addition, to escape the 
needless convolution of such doctrines, the Court has inserted subjective criteria 
into the mix. Co-existing alongside abstract doctrines in the jurisprudence are 
perceptive concepts like context, vulnerability, and human dignity. More often than 
not, those considerations, and not the even-handed application of a structured 
methodology, determine the outcome. To summarize, the Court claims adherence 
to a structured methodology and then employs result-oriented criteria to decide 
                                                                                                                                                              
50
  The dissenters were united in their conclusion that the infringement of s. 15(1) was not 
saved under s. 1 of the Charter. 
51
  Law is not without its defenders: see Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of 
Equality” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299 (concluding that while Law contains certain problems, the 
framework it establishes is preferable to alternatives); Errol P. Mendes, “Taking Equality Into the 
21st Century: Establishing the Concept of Equal Human Dignity” (2000-01) 12 N.J.C.L. 3 (lauding 
“the dominant artistic vision” of “equal human dignity”). 
52
  Other criticisms of Law are contained in the articles referenced in note 5, supra. 
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cases. Charter adjudication does not take place under a methodology but rather, 
under the cover of methodology.53 
Simply put, the Law methodology is overly complex and fails to articulate a 
workable standard that can be applied with any degree of objectivity: “its 
criteria are long-winded, intertwined, abstract, and yet, as the Court cautioned, 
not exhaustive at that. … Law has confirmed that adding layers upon layers of 
doctrinal criteria does not lend precision to the decision making process.”54 
Law’s open-ended multi-factor test fails to provide trial judges with sufficient 
tools to balance various considerations, and fails to instruct judges how all the 
various factors are to be added up in order to reach a reasoned rather than ad-
hoc or results-oriented conclusion.55 The indeterminacy of Law undermines the 
rule of law.56  
For all its complexity, the Law methodology seems to boil down to a single 
inquiry: does the impugned provision violate human dignity? Human dignity is 
a hopelessly abstract concept. While objectivity could likely be reached on a 
few core aspects of human dignity such as the right to be free from torture, 
venturing beyond this small core becomes hazy and subjective very quickly.57 
The problem with human dignity is that it says nothing more specific about the 
content of section 15 than it does about any other section of the Charter. Human 
dignity “underlies the entire Charter and therefore cannot serve to differentiate 
equality rights from other Charter rights. If anything … ‘dignity belongs more 
to the realm of individual rights than to group based historical disadvantage.’”58 
Second, the Law methodology usurps the role of section 1. Under Law, the 
purpose of the legislation is considered at both the section 15 and the section 1 
                                                                                                                                                              
53
  Cameron, supra, note 5, at 32.  
54
  Id., at 35. 
55
  Professor Greschner has defended the complexity and subjectivity of Law on the grounds 
that discrimination is a complex concept: “An effective approach [to s. 15] will be complex because 
the phenomenon of inequality is complex. It is well to remember the old adage: for every complex 
problem, there is a simple answer, and it is always wrong.” Greschner, supra, note 51, at 317-18. 
We are mindful of the complexity of the issue. Our response is that these complex issues should be 
determined, at the s. 1 stage where the government bears the burden of demonstrating whether the 
impugned provision or program is justifiable.  
56
  On the meaning and importance of the Rule of Law, see Reference re Resolution to amend 
the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, at 805-06 [hereinafter “Patriation Reference”] and Reference 
re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 70 [hereinafter “Quebec Secession Refer-
ence”]. 
57
  “While it may be easier to determine when human dignity is demeaned, it will be more 
difficult to articulate why it is not.” Martin, supra, note 5, at 329. Even one of Law’s few defenders 
acknowledges that Law’s focus on human dignity is misplaced. See Greschner, supra, note 51, at 
312-13 (“Dignity becomes an assertion, not an analysis.”). 
58
  Greschner, supra, note 51, at 312 quoting Martin, supra, note 5, at 329. 
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stage. As well, the test articulated by the Court for the determination of 
“discrimination” under section 15(1) contains many of the same elements found 
in the proportionality part of the section 1 analysis. Finally, the heavy reliance 
on “context” in section 1 is matched by the Court’s insistence on “context” in 
the application of the section 1 test.59 The effect of this overlap is to create a 
repetitive test which, as applied, tends to strip section 1 of any meaningful role. 
At least one member of the Court has acknowledged this problem.60 What the 
Court has called “purposive interpretation” in defining the right under section 
15, is in fact an exercise in the determination of the reasonableness of the 
classification at issue. Under Law, justification takes place under the guise of 
purposive interpretation. 
Finally, certain aspects of the Law methodology are highly problematic. For 
instance, the focus on the comparator group and the history of discrimination 
and disadvantage creates a “race to the bottom.” In the quest to be measured 
against the appropriate comparator group, a claimant is required to prove that 
his or her group is more disadvantaged that the comparator group lest they find 
themselves in the situation of the temporarily disabled claimant in Granovsky, 
informed by the Court that he is better off, compared with the permanently 
disabled. This analysis invites the creation of a hierarchy of suffering.  
IV. KEY PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY ANALYSIS 
In developing a framework for the analysis of equality claims under the 
Charter, there are essentially four elements that must be considered: (a) the 
classification; (b) the purpose of the legislation; (c) the effect of the legislation; 
and (d) the reasonableness of the classification in the context of the legislation. 
These principles are not controversial; they can be found in the Supreme 
Court’s equality jurisprudence from Andrews to Law. The issue is at what stage 
of the Charter inquiry — breach or justification — each factor should be 
considered. These elements constitute the background principles for 
consideration of any framework for analysis under section 15. 
1. Classifications 
Classifications matter. Common sense tells us that we should be more 
concerned about some classifications than others. Our response would differ to 
a tax imposed by the government on members of a particular racial group than 
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  Bredt & Nishisato, supra, note 5. See also Bredt & Dodek, supra, note 5, at 181-82. 
60
  See Gosselin, supra, note 44, at para. 244 (per Bastarache J.). 
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it would to a tax imposed on coffee drinkers.61 Classification mattered to the 
drafters of the Charter who made the choice to enumerate certain classifications 
in section 15. It certainly mattered to members of groups who were enumerated 
in section 15 who thought their inclusion under that section indicated some 
level of constitutional protection. Classification mattered to groups excluded 
from section 15 who fought vigorously for the inclusion of additional 
classifications, some successfully (e.g., disability) and some unsuccessfully 
(e.g., sexual orientation). No test under section 15 can ignore the text of the 
Charter that gives credence to certain classifications. The use of classifications 
reflects the belief that a conception of equality grows out of the experience of 
discrimination against particular vulnerable groups in society and the collective 
feeling of uneasiness about using certain classifications in legislation.62 
2. Purpose of the Legislation 
All legislation creates classifications. An important step in the equality 
analysis must therefore be an analysis of the purpose of the legislation. This 
step will seek to determine what the legislation is trying to accomplish and 
                                                                                                                                                              
61
  The problem of “adverse effects” or “constructive discrimination” is discussed below in 
the section on the Effect of the Law. 
62
  There is nothing novel about the concern with classifications in the Charter; it has become 
an international phenomenon, since at least the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the 
“Universal Declaration”) in 1948. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro-
vides, in pertinent part: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Constitutional bills of rights such 
as the Charter tend to be concerned about classifications and manifest this concern in different 
ways. Modern bills of rights tend to follow the example of the Universal Declaration and expressly 
enumerate certain classifications that are constitutionally protected. For example, the South African 
Bill of Rights (1996) which was strongly influenced by the Charter, provides in its equality section 
that: “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” Consti-
tution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, s. 8(3). The New Zealand Bill of Rights, 
while not a constitutional bill of rights, takes a similar approach. See New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act of 1990, s. 19, as amended (“Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993.”) (The Human Rights Act 1993 enumer-
ates specific prohibited grounds of discrimination). See “Freedom from Discrimination” in Paul 
Rishworth et al., eds., The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). An older bill of rights, such as the American which does not expressly enumerate 
classifications, uses classifications through the development of different levels of scrutiny for 
“suspect”, “semi-suspect” and “non-suspect” classes. As noted by the Chief Justice of Canada, we 
can learn from the experience of other countries in interpreting our own Constitution. McLachlin, 
supra, note 4, at 27. 
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make a judgment about the importance of the legislative objective. Some 
legislative purposes are pedestrian whereas others may be critical to the well-
being of the nation. There is a difference, in short, between legislation that 
authorizes spending for road repair and legislation that declares martial law in 
time of war. Some transparent discussion of the purpose of the legislation is 
necessary in all equality analyses. 
3. Effect of the Law 
The effect of the legislation is relevant in two respects. First, it is relevant in 
the sense of the interests being affected by the legislation in question. There is a 
difference between the imposition of a height and weight requirement as a job 
requirement and its imposition at a carnival ride. Leaving aside issues of 
reasonableness, the effect of the height and weight requirement in the first 
instance is more severe because employment is a much more important interest 
than the opportunity to go on a carnival ride. Any equality test must give some 
consideration to the interests at stake. 
The effect of the legislation is relevant in the second respect in terms of its 
impact on particular classifications. Laws may explicitly invoke “suspect” 
classifications, but many laws may use one form of classification that has an 
“adverse impact” on other classifications. For example, imposing a requirement 
that firefighter candidates must be at least six feet tall and 200 pounds in weight 
imposes a classification on its face relating to height and weight. However, it 
may be demonstrated, through empirical data, that these height and weight 
requirements have an adverse impact on other classifications which are more 
suspect than height and weight, such as sex or race. 
4. Reasonableness of the Classification 
Determining the reasonableness of the classification in the context of the 
legislation in issue is the most important and the most difficult part of the 
equality analysis. It also contains the greatest aspect of subjectivity: reasonable 
people will disagree on the reasonableness of the use of particular 
classifications in various contexts.63 Given the inescapable subjectivity of this 
inquiry, it is important that the reasonableness inquiry be as transparent as 
possible in order to protect the courts’ legitimacy. There are a number of 
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  We believe that Law’s human dignity analysis is an overly complex means of layering this 
inquiry into reasonableness. Cases such as Lavoie and Gosselin can be reduced to a difference of 
opinion among members of the Court as to the reasonableness of considering citizenship for public 
service jobs (Lavoie) and of using age to restrict welfare benefits (Gosselin). 
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factors that the courts have often considered, but which are not always 
expressly identified as relevant factors in the reasonableness inquiry. These 
include: (i) whether the legislation is over or underinclusive; and (ii) the nature 
of the classification. These should be identified and addressed by courts 
directly in an open and frank manner. We discuss these two factors in more 
detail below. 
(a) Over- and Underinclusive Legislation 
The first consideration is whether the impugned legislation is over- or 
underinclusive. In an influential 1949 law review article which has been (in our 
view unfairly,)64 maligned because it was seen as the genesis of the “similarly-
situated” test, Tussman and tenBroek explain the relationship between the 
purpose of the legislation and the classifications used by the law.65 There are 
five possible relationships between the class defined by the legislation’s 
purpose and the class defined by the trait identified in any legislation: 
 
(i) There can be complete overlap between the purpose of the legislation 
and those affected by it, and vice-versa; in Oakes’66 terms, the “least re-
strictive means” has been used to achieve a perfect fit between the ob-
jective of the law and the means chosen;  
(ii) There can be complete asymmetry between the objective of the legisla-
tion and those affected by it, and vice versa; in Oakes’ terms, there is no 
“rational connection” between the objective and the means chosen; 
(iii) The legislation is underinclusive because it applies only to  
a subset of the group that falls within the purpose of the legislation;  
(iv) The legislation is overinclusive because it applies to a larger group than 
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the legislation; and 
(v) The legislation is both overinclusive and underinclusive because in clas-
sifying the group covered by the legislation it both overshoots and un-
dershoots its purpose. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
64
  This view is shared by the Court of Appeal for Ontario. See Catholic Children’s Aid Soci-
ety of Metropolitan Toronto v. S. (T.) (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 189, at 205-206 (C.A.). 
65
  See Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, “The Equal Protection of the Laws” (1948-
49) 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341. We believe that many of the ideas proffered by Tussman and tenBroek 
continue to maintain strong empirical and normative force despite attempts by courts and commen-
tators to disassociate themselves from the “similarly-situated” enquiry. We believe that their ideas 
of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness have always been part of equality analysis in Canada 
and are a necessary but not sufficient part of any reasonableness inquiry.  
66
  R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
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These concepts are best understood through concrete examples. Consider the 
situation where the state determines to legislate qualifications for firefighters. It 
needs firefighters to have a certain minimum strength in order to be able to haul 
heavy equipment and carry people out of burning buildings. As a result of its 
experience, the state knows that it needs its firefighters to have the capacity to 
carry a 200 pound object over 50 metres. It also knows that statistical evidence 
shows that most people who are six feet tall or over and weigh at least 200 
pounds will be able to complete this task. If the state sets a requirement that 
“All firefighter candidates must be able to carry at least 250 pounds over 50 
metres”, this law will be underinclusive because while everyone within the 
group will meet the purpose of the law, there will be others (who can carry 
between 200 and 249 pounds over 50 metres) who will be excluded but meet 
the target or purpose of the law. If the requirement is changed to, “All 
firefighter candidates must be able to carry at least 150 pounds over 50 metres” 
it becomes overinclusive because it will include everyone who can meet the 
purpose of the law (200 pounds over 50 metres), but it will also include others 
who cannot (150-199 pounds over 50 metres). The requirement may be both 
underinclusive and overinclusive at the same time, consider: “All Firefighter 
candidates must be at least six feet in height and 200 pounds in weight.” This is 
underinclusive, because it excludes those people who do not meet the 
requirements but who are actually capable of meeting the law’s purpose, i.e., of 
carrying 200 pounds over 50 metres. It is also overinclusive because it will 
include some people who meet the height and weight requirement but who are 
not able to meet the law’s purpose of carrying 200 pounds over 50 metres. 
When the requirement is changed to “All firefighter candidates must be able to 
carry at least 200 pounds over 50 metres” then it accords perfectly with its 
purpose. 
Generally, we consider underinclusiveness to be more reasonable than 
overinclusiveness on the grounds that the legislature should be given some 
latitude in addressing a social problem in a step-by-step approach and not be 
forced to address the entire problem at first instance, lest it never actually do so. 
Underinclusiveness is especially tolerated when it comes to government 
spending and benefits; cases like Granovsky are better explained in terms of 
tolerance for underinclusiveness in government benefit programs than by any 
recourse to human dignity. 
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(b) Nature of Classification 
In determining reasonableness, the nature of the classification is also an 
important factor.67 We believe that it is implicit in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in cases such as McKinney,68 Law69 and Gosselin70 that discrimination 
on the basis of age is more reasonable than discrimination on the basis of other 
grounds, such as race or religion. However, it is important that this implicit 
assumption be expressly acknowledged and justified. Distinctions based on age 
are more reasonable because they impact all members of society, although not 
at the same point in time. Classifications based on age are only unequal when 
one looks at them at a specific point in time. However, when examined over the 
course of a lifetime, all members of society are potentially subject to such 
classifications, which mitigates potential unfairness to some degree.71 In this 
sense, age is not immutable in the same way that race, colour or national origin 
are. Classifications based on those latter grounds impose a “legislative tax” on a 
select portion of the population that will never be shared by its other 
members.72 The “unfairness” of distinctions based on age is more fairly 
distributed throughout the population than distinctions based on other 
classifications. 
As noted at the outset, all of these factors are already part of the Supreme 
Court’s approach to the interpretation of section 15(1). The next part of the 
paper considers how they should be distributed between section 15(1) and 
section 1. 
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  American jurisprudence makes this explicit through different “levels of scrutiny.” 
68
  Supra, note 16. 
69
  Supra, note 3. 
70
  Supra, note 44. 
71
  Thus, restrictions that impose minimum ages to vote, drive or purchase alcohol are bur-
dens that all members of society will share in. Similarly, age restrictions imposed on persons aged 
65 and beyond are burdens in which all members of society will share. 
72
  We have taken this idea from Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1997), at 158-61. Professor Kennedy explains racial profiling in policing in terms 
of the imposition of a “racial tax” on certain minority groups. For example, “When a Mexican-
American motorist is selected for questioning in part on the basis of his perceived ancestry, he is 
undoubtedly being burdened more heavily at that moment on account of his race than his white 
Anglo counterpart. He is being made to pay a type of racial tax for the campaign against illegal 
immigration, that whites, blacks, and Asians escape. Similarly, a young black man selected for 
questioning by police as he alights from an airplane or drives a car is being made to pay a type of 
racial tax for the war against drugs that whites and other groups escape. That tax is the cost of being 
subjected to greater scrutiny than others.” Id., at 158-59. 
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V. A RENEWED APPROACH TO SECTION 15 
For the reasons set out in part III, the Law framework is both unworkable in 
practice and undesirable in principle, and should be abandoned. Instead, we 
argue in favour of a return to a modified version of the Andrews test. In this 
approach, the issue of the reasonableness of the classification in the context of 
the legislation is reserved for section 1. The inquiry under section 15 thus 
becomes a much simpler determination of whether the classification in question 
is based on an enumerated or analogous ground and whether it creates a 
disadvantage.73 
1. The Question of Breach — Section 15(1) Analysis 
(a) The Two-Step Approach 
In the modified Andrews approach that we propose, the inquiry of whether 
there is a breach under section 15 of the Charter would be restricted to a two-
part test: (1) does the legislation have either the purpose or effect of 
distinguishing between the claimant and others based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground; and (2) does that distinction disadvantage the claimant? If 
the answer to both these questions is yes, then the matter proceeds to section 1 
for a consideration of whether the prima facie infringement of section 15 is 
justified as a “reasonable limitation” on equality rights. 
This proposed approach restricts the application of section 15 to enumerated 
and analogous grounds. In section (c) of this part, we explain the basis for this. 
We note that if it is established that the legislation has the purpose or effect of 
distinguishing between the plaintiff and others on an enumerated ground or on 
the basis of an acknowledged analogous ground (such as citizenship or sexual 
orientation), all that is left for the claimant to establish in order to proceed to 
section 1 is that the legislation disadvantages members of the 
enumerated/analogous ground. 
(b) Analogous Grounds 
If the claimant seeks to found a claim based on an analogous ground that has 
not been previously recognized, the claimant will carry the burden of 
establishing that the court should recognize a particular classification as 
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  We have consciously avoided discussion of the role of s. 15(2) in this paper. The special 
considerations of s. 15(2) necessitate detailed consideration which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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analogous to those that are enumerated under section 15(1).74 The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area is helpful and should be followed. According 
to the Court, an analogous ground is one that is based on “a personal 
characteristic that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to 
personal identity.”75 In Andrews, La Forest J., in recognizing citizenship as an 
analogous ground, stated as follows: “The characteristic of citizenship is one 
typically not within the control of the individual and, in this sense, is 
immutable. Citizenship is, at least temporarily, a characteristic of personhood 
not alterable by conscious action and in some cases not alterable except on the 
basis of unacceptable costs.”76 The Court has also emphasized that historical 
disadvantage is an important factor to consider in determining an analogous 
ground.77 
(c) The Limited Notion of Disadvantage 
The determination of “disadvantage” at the breach step should be a limited 
and primarily factual inquiry. In Andrews, McIntyre J. rightly concluded that 
section 15(1) was designed to prevent discrimination based on the enumerated 
and analogous grounds.78 In subsequent cases, various justices seized on 
McIntyre J.’s use of the term “discrimination” in order to construct additional 
qualifiers on the section 15 inquiry. While invoking Andrews, these subsequent 
decisions strayed from the limitations imposed by McIntyre J. on the 
discrimination inquiry.79 
We have used the word “disadvantage” because of the loaded nature of the 
term “discrimination” and the extent to which it has been used after Andrews to 
embark on what are essentially inquiries into the reasonableness of the 
classification at issue. However, we agree with what McIntyre J. envisioned at 
                                                                                                                                                              
74
  For a good discussion of the characteristics of the enumerated grounds, see Peter W. 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at s. 52.7(c) [here-
inafter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf-ed.]. 
75
  Corbière, supra, note 38, at para. 13 (per McLachlin and Bastarache JJ., for the majority). 
76
  Andrews, supra, note 1, at 195 (per La Forest J.). 
77
  See Egan, supra, note 2, at 498 (per McLachlin J., Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci JJ., con-
curring). 
78
  Andrews, supra, note 1, at 180. 
79
  According to Professor Cameron, “Andrews left unresolved whether a classification based 
on prohibited grounds would establish a breach, or whether section 15 required proof, in addition, 
that the classification was discriminatory. The possibility that the prohibited grounds might not 
suffice created new opportunities for section 1’s function to invade section 15.” Cameron, supra, 
note 5, at 34. We agree with Professor Cameron that Andrews left this possibility open; however, 
for the reasons described above, we believe that the discrimination inquiry envisioned by Andrews 
was a limited one which did not invade the province of s. 1. 
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the breach step in determination of whether there was 
discrimination/disadvantage for the purposes of section 15(1). As McIntyre J. 
explained the term, the discrimination inquiry under section 15(1) is a limited 
one. It is restricted to determining whether the impugned distinction “has the 
effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual 
group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to 
opportunities, benefits or advantages available to other members of society.”80 
In short, the discrimination inquiry under section 15(1) is restricted to 
determining a prima facie disadvantage. This should not involve a detailed 
objective/subjective inquiry into whether a reasonable person considering all 
the circumstances of the claimant would consider that the distinction was 
discriminatory in a purposive sense or whether the distinction impairs human 
dignity. Such inquiries are all thinly-veiled attempts at justification which are 
properly the subject of section 1. 
(d) Disadvantage in Purpose or Effect 
Legislation that clearly disadvantages the claimant on the basis of an 
enumerated and analogous ground will make it relatively simple for the 
claimant to establish a prima facie breach and proceed to section 1: “No women 
may be firefighters.” However, much discrimination is subtler and is the result 
of the discriminatory impact of a facially-neutral provision on a class: “All 
firefighters must be at least six feet tall and weigh at least 200 pounds.” In the 
last example, the proposed legislation may have an adverse impact on members 
of an enumerated group, such as sex or race. In this instance, the claimant will 
be required to adduce evidence to carry the burden of proof of demonstrating 
that the impugned legislation has the effect of creating a disadvantage based on 
an enumerated or analogous ground. This should be primarily a factual inquiry 
and not involve normative considerations as to the legislation’s reasonable-
ness. 
2. The Question of Justification — Section 1 Analysis 
At the section 1 stage, the government bears the burden of justifying that the 
impugned provision is a “reasonable limitation” in a free and democratic 
society. It is at this stage that it is proper for the court to make all 
determinations as to the reasonableness of the legislative classification in the 
context of the purpose of the legislation. There are three essential components 
to justification under section 1: (i) an inquiry into the purpose of the legislation; 
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  Id., at 174. 
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(ii) a review of the classification in question; and (iii) a determination of how 
closely tailored the classification is to the purpose of the legislation. 
(a) Purpose of the Legislation 
In considering the purpose of the legislation, the court should inquire into 
what it is that the legislation is seeking to accomplish and how important that 
objective is. It should be acknowledged that not all purposes are “pressing and 
substantial,” yet the government may ultimately be able to demonstrably justify 
a limit as “reasonable” in a free and democratic society on the strength of other 
factors. The purpose of a restriction on washrooms to “Men” and “Women” is 
difficult to articulate as “pressing and substantial.” The government should be 
forced to articulate the importance of its legislative objective or administrative 
rule and courts should be required to classify the importance of the purpose as 
“ordinary,” “important” or “pressing and substantial.”  
(b) The Classification in Question 
The Oakes test is not particularly well-suited for this inquiry and should be 
modified to expressly acknowledge what the Court has implicitly accepted: 
different classifications will attract varying degrees of deference. It is extremely 
difficult to imagine the Court giving much deference to classifications based on 
race whereas the Court has demonstrated a high degree of deference for 
classifications based on age.81 These different standards of scrutiny should be 
expressly articulated by the Court. 
(c) The Question of Fit 
The court should consider how appropriate the classification is in connection 
to the purpose of the legislation. Consideration should be given to whether the 
legislation extends a benefit or imposes a burden and whether the legislation is 
underinclusive or overinclusive. For the reasons given above, underinclusive 
legislation will often be easier to justify than overinclusive legislation. 
3. Rationales and Response to Critics 
The approach proposed, which requires classifications based on enumerated 
and analogous grounds to show only a disadvantage and leaves to section 1 the 
question of the reasonableness of the classification, is supported by (i) the text 
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  See discussion in parts II and III, supra, regarding McKinney, Law, and Gosselin. 
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and history of the Charter; (ii) the structure of the Charter; and (iii) the 
importance of greater transparency and clarity to the rule of law. 
(a) Respect for the Text 
Our proposed approach gives pride of place to the grounds enumerated in the 
text of section 15 and those that are “analogous” to them. It is submitted that 
certainly some weight must be given to the text of section 15 which expressly 
enumerates certain grounds of discrimination. The focus on enumerated and 
analogous grounds under section 15(1) accords with the constitutional history 
and purpose of this section. Section 15 was not enacted in a vacuum. As has 
been recognized repeatedly, a constitutional right to equality was enshrined in 
the Charter against the backdrop of the perceived failures of the Canadian Bill 
of Rights and the history of discrimination in this country against specific 
groups. In the public hearings before the Special Joint Committee, equality-
seeking groups testified about concrete experiences of discrimination that they 
had experienced or faced in Canadian society for which they sought a remedy 
in section 15; they did not seek a means that would require them to convince 
courts that their human dignity was being impaired on a case-by-case basis.82 In 
short, having fought to be specifically included under section 15, members of 
equality-seeking groups should not have to establish a prime facie violation of 
section 15 anew in each equality case.83 The reference to discrimination in 
                                                                                                                                                              
82
  In an impassioned testimony before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, Da-
vid Lepofsky on behalf of the Canadian National Institute of the Blind, detailed concrete examples 
of legislative distinctions against the handicapped which disadvantaged them. Similarly, representa-
tives of the Canadian Black community and the Japanese-Canadian community spoke of their 
experiences with discrimination. Simply put, in interpreting the Charter, one must take account of 
the history of discrimination in Canada against particular groups: the internment of Japanese 
Canadians; the persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Quebec, the treatment of the Chinese in 
British Columbia and the imposition of the head tax.  
83
  We cannot put the issue better than Mr. Wilson Head who as President of the National 
Black Coalition of Canada testified as follows before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitu-
tion: 
… in the final analysis it should be up to the government itself to say why certain 
rights are abrogated. It should not be up to the people to have to continue to fight for the 
rights, the government should confer these rights in a very general sense on the one hand, 
but specific on another, and at the same time say that if the government wishes to restrict 
these rights in any way, let the government make the case; that the burden of proof be upon 
the government to make the case that these rights ought to be abrogated.  
Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate 
and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1st session of the 32d Parliament, 
1980-81, 22:11 (December 9, 1980) [hereinafter “Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee on 
the Constitution”]. 
(2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) Breaking the Law’s 57 
 Grip on Equality 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20     CRA           Date:Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
section 15 should also be understood in light of the development of human 
rights acts which protected against discrimination on various enumerated 
grounds. Section 15 was largely modelled after these acts.84 
Moreover, our argument for a return to a limited Andrews-like approach to 
breach is supported by the text of section 15(2) which provides that 
“Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” The use of 
the term “disadvantaged” in section 15(2) supports the interpretation of 
“discrimination” that we propose for section 15(1). 
(b) Structure of the Charter 
A limited inquiry under section 15(1) also accords with the constitutional 
structure of the Charter. Numerous scholars have written about the structure of 
the Charter and its separation of rights and limits.85 Interpretive theories should 
respect the text’s separation between “breach and justification.”86 
To date, the Court has not lent sufficient credence to the burden placed on 
government to justify limitations on rights under section 1. In part, this is due to 
the Court painting itself into a corner through the rigidity of the Oakes analysis. 
Every section 15(1) analysis is undertaken with the sword of Oakes hanging 
over a court’s head which, if minimal impairment is to be taken seriously, is 
likely to torpedo most limitations on equality. The judicial response has been to 
use the malleable concepts of “substantive equality,” discrimination and human 
dignity to sidestep Oakes. However, this interpretive choice has profoundly 
negative consequences for Charter adjudication. 
The purpose and the logic of the Charter requires governments to justify 
limitations on Charter rights. “Any test of discrimination which asks whether 
the differential treatment is reasonable or unreasonable, permissible or 
impermissible, is another way of inquiring whether it is justifiable or not.”87 
Importing any justification criteria into section 15 requires the rights claimant 
to prove that the limit is not justified — in essence to prove a negative. Not 
only is this logically problematic but it presents the rights claimant with a 
daunting evidentiary task. In cases of adverse effects discrimination, a rights 
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  Andrews, supra, note 1, at 172. 
85
  See e.g. Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 of the Char-
ter” (1988) 10 Sup. Ct. L. Rev., 469; Cameron, supra, note 5; and Bredt & Dodek, supra, note 5. 
86
  Professor Cameron has recently written about the Supreme Court’s infidelity to the struc-
tural logic of the Charter. See Cameron, supra, note 5. 
87
  Cameron, supra, note 5, at 35. 
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claimant under section 15 will be required to demonstrate to the court that the 
impugned legislation has a discriminatory effect on an enumerated or 
analogous group. This will likely require detailed empirical evidence that is 
able to demonstrate the legislation’s impact on a particular class of individuals. 
This in itself is a difficult task for a prospective litigant. However, the challenge 
is compounded when the litigant is required to adduce evidence under the Law 
methodology to prove a violation of human dignity, including evidence of 
historic disadvantage, stereotyping, correspondence between the basis for the 
claim and the actual situation of the claimant; the ameliorative purpose or 
effects of the impugned legislation upon a more disadvantaged group; and the 
nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned legislation. Moreover, 
because the list of contextual factors is open-ended, the rights claimant, while 
having the opportunity to adduce additional evidence, may be faced with other 
“contextual factors” for which she has not developed evidence. The claimant 
may not even know the case he or she is to meet in order to prove his or her 
claim. 
(c) Transparency, Clarity, and the Rule of Law 
The modified Andrews approach attempts to inject greater transparency in 
the analysis of equality claims by clearly identifying a more limited number of 
objective factors for the court to consider and by discarding hopelessly 
subjective concepts such as “human dignity.” In transferring all considerations 
of reasonableness from the breach to the justification stage, this approach also 
heightens government accountability. The modified Andrews approach 
proposed in this paper thus establishes a framework that is easier for equality 
claimants and their lawyers to understand and for courts to apply. 
Transparency, clarity, and greater predictability are the essence of the rule of 
law.88 
(d) Response to Critics 
The enumerated and analogous grounds approach upon which our modified 
Andrews approach is based has been attacked on the grounds that it is 
                                                                                                                                                              
88
  The rule of law is “a highly textured expression, importing many things … but conveying, 
for example, a sense of orderliness, of subjection to known legal rules and of executive accountabil-
ity to legal authority.” See Patriation Reference, supra, note 56, at 805-06. In the Quebec Secession 
Reference, supra, note 56, the Court explained that “[a]t its most basic level the rule of law vouch-
safes to the citizens and residents of the country a stable, predictable and ordered society in which 
to conduct their affairs.” Id., at para. 70. 
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formalistic and inconsistent with substantive equality.89 We disagree because 
we do not believe that a consensus exists as to the meaning of substantive 
equality. This is demonstrated by the cases following Law in which the 
Supreme Court has been sharply divided on this issue. Support for substantive 
equality simply does not assist in establishing a workable framework for 
adjudication of section 15 claims. 
As to the charge of formalism, we acknowledge that in attempting to 
articulate a more objective test, our approach is both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive. However, for all the reasons set out above, we believe that this is 
preferable to the unbridled subjectivity of Law and of the abstract and uncertain 
principles propounded by the proponents of substantive equality.  
A modified Andrews approach is under-inclusive in the sense that it does not 
catch all “discrimination,” but only that on enumerated or analogous grounds. 
Essentially, this gives the legislature a license to discriminate on all other bases. 
We accept this and acknowledge that discrimination in the neutral sense of the 
term is the business of legislating. If, as some have argued,90 all legislation that 
discriminates in the sense of drawing a distinction between classes of people 
should be held to violate section 15(1) and require justification under section 1, 
then every single piece of legislation would be susceptible to a Charter 
challenge.91 This would import an aspect of American equal protection analysis 
that does not accord with our constitutional history.92  
                                                                                                                                                              
89
  See Greschner, supra, note 51, at 308 and Douglas Kropp, “ ‘Categorical’ Failure: Cana-
da’s Equality Jurisprudence — Changing Notions of Identity and the Legal Subject” (1997) 21 
Queen’s L.J. 201. 
90
  See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., supra, note 7, at 797-801; and Camer-
on, supra, note 5, at 40. 
91
  Professor Hogg noted that virtually any benefit programs were susceptible to a charge of 
underinclusiveness. See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 
1992), at 911-12.  
92
  Under such a framework, one would have to begin to articulate a purpose for s. 15 that fo-
cused far more on individuals and their interaction with government than on historically-
disadvantaged or discriminated-against groups. One would have to articulate a purpose that argues 
that government must be absolutely neutral in its dealings with all citizens. While such a libertarian 
argument may be philosophically defensible, it does not accord with the history of the Canadian 
state and the role of government, let alone with the “Trudeau vision” of a “Just Society” fuelled by 
undisciplined government spending and intervention in all aspects of society. See generally Andrew 
Coyne, “Social Spending, taxes, and the Debt: Trudeau’s Just Society” in Andrew Cohen & J.L. 
Granatstein, eds., Trudeau’s Shadow (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1998), at 223; Thomas 
S. Axworthy & Pierre Eliott Trudeau, Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years (Toronto: 
Viking, 1990); and Stephen Clarkson & Christina McCall, Trudeau and Our Times: Volume 2: The 
Heroic Delusion (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1994). The idea of absolute state neutrality 
would be anathema to many of the persons who were the driving force behind the 
constitutionalization of a bill of rights for Canada. 
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The modified Andrews approach is also over-inclusive in the sense that some 
distinctions which are considered acceptable in society will meet both 
components of the section 15(1) test and be held to be prima facie 
discriminatory. We see this as an issue for section 1, not for section 15(1). 
Requiring the government to justify all distinctions based on enumerated and 
analogous grounds is desirable. It forces government to articulate reasons for 
long-held policies which may or may not change over time.  
We do not believe that the Oakes test should be used to straightjacket the 
interpretation of section 15. Fear that the rigidity of the Oakes test will result in 
much legislation being struck down or in the Oakes test being watered-down is 
overstated. The practical reality is that Oakes is not monolithic — for example, 
the Supreme Court applies a much different Oakes test when it considers a 
commercial expression claim under section 2(b) than it does when considering 
a criminal defendant’s rights under section 11. Explicit recognition or 
reconsideration of different applications of section 1 by the Court would also be 
welcome. 
Our hope is to inject greater transparency into the adjudication of equality 
claims under section 15 by forcing courts to make explicit many assumptions 
that have heretofore been implicit and allowed to be buried under layer upon 
layer of “context.”  
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this difficult and controversial area of the law, we make no pretensions of 
having found the Rosetta Stone to unlocking equality. However, we do believe 
that a modified Andrews approach based on the principles and the framework 
set out in Andrews is a preferable approach to what has developed since. 
Focusing on concepts such as substantive equality and human dignity at the 
section 15(1) stage is a hopelessly abstract and subjective enterprise which is 
well-suited to legislative policy discussions and philosophy classes, but not to 
the process of adjudication. Sometimes additional attempts to tweak the picture 
makes the whole screen more fuzzy. As Peter Hogg noted in commenting on 
post-Andrews jurisprudence, “[t]here is nothing wrong with this picture and I 
am at a loss to discover why the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
having painted it so successfully in Andrews, have been struggling so hard to 
blur it ever since.”93 
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